September, 2001: Publius

By Greg Rushford
Published in The Rushford Report

Congressional Democrats have been in full throat recently, accusing President George W. Bush of running a “unilateralist” foreign policy. There’s at least a kernel of truth to that. But however the Bush presidency shapes up — and it’s far too early to say much either way — one thing is certain: The real unilateralists are in the U.S. Congress. They are the micromanagers.

The micromanagement of American foreign policy from Capitol Hill —which has been increasing steadily for the past quarter century, since the Vietnam War — is now a serious, bipartisan problem. Anti-United Nations Republicans like the retiring Sen. Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) and Indiana’s protectionist Rep. Dan Burton (the other end of Helms-Burton) have inspired enough foreign-policy embarrassments to fill a small library. And pork-loving Republicans like Sen. Ted Stevens (R-Alaska) have teamed up with Democratic unilateralists like Robert Byrd (D-W.VA.) to skew defense spending for years. Every year Stevens, Byrd & Co. force the Pentagon to spend some $5-6 billion to buy weapons it doesn’t want or need.

But the micromanagement problem has deeper roots. The problem is not just politicians who are willing to abuse the system to advance their own agendas. The problem is that Congress is flyspecking U.S. foreign policy. Perhaps the best illustration of what’s been going on comes from the mild-mannered, certainly well intended, Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-VT.). Leahy — who doesn’t really have much of a background in foreign policy — acts as if he knows more about dictating the priorities of Indonesia policy than do the Secretaries of Defense and State.

And these days, to be at the Pentagon or State Department is to be pestered mercilessly by lawmakers. There are armies of auditors at the Pentagon for whom forests of trees are fells to produce enough paper to write more than 900 annual reports to Congress. “There’s no sunset” on these things, the harried Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld complained to the Washington Post last month. Over at the State Department, Secretary Colin Powell has a similar problem.

One of the multitude of reports has to be written to satisfy Sen. Leahy.

Three years ago, understandably outraged by the Indonesian military’s participation in atrocities in East Timor, Leahy sought a legislative fix. In November 1999, the Vermont lawmaker attached an amendment to the Foreign Operations Appropriations measure. Sec. 589 (a) Military Assistance specified that funds for “International Military Education and Training” and “Foreign Military Financing” may be made available only “if the President determines and submits a report to the appropriate congressional committees that the Indonesian Government and the Indonesian Armed forces are” doing six things.

Those six things that the president of the United States determines that the Indonesian military has been doing include “taking effective measures to bring to justice members of the Armed Forces and militia groups against whom there is credible evidence of human rights violations.” The president must also certify to Congress that the Indonesian military has been “demonstrating a commitment to accountability by cooperating with investigations and prosecutions of members of the Indonesian Armed Forces and militia groups responsible for human rights violations in Indonesia and East Timor.”

Alas, no president of the United States could honestly certify such.

But — and this is a big But — despite its inability to come to terms with its sordid background, Indonesia’s military has made real progress toward helping Indonesia become a democracy since 1999. The military has stayed out of the last two presidential elections. The brass have agreed to reduce the number of their assigned seats in the parliament. Like her predecessor, Gus Dur, newly elected President Megawati Sukarnoputri has named a civilian as secretary of defense. If Megawati is going to succeed in holding the country together, she has to look to her country’s military as an essential tool.

Meanwhile, contrary to its fine intentions, thanks to the Leahy amendment, the United States has basically dealt itself out of the game of reforming the Indonesian military. The Clinton administration interpreted Leahy strictly; present American influence on and contacts with the Indonesian military are zilch. The incoming Bush team has put out the word that it would like to increase contacts with Indonesia’s military — ship visits, joint exercises, for instance. But first they have to get around Secretary of State Patrick Leahy.

I called Leahy’s press secretary, David Carle, to ask if the senator thinks now that in light of the changes in Indonesia since 1999, the Leahy amendment has outlived its usefulness. The answer was: “No.”

“The senator’s view hasn’t changed and won’t in the future,” Carle said. “He believes that military contacts can be useful only if we are conveying the message of reform.”

I asked what Leahy thinks the main U.S. national security goal should be for Indonesia.

“The question is reform of the military,” Carle responded. “That’s the focus of U.S. policy.”

Leahy’s narrow view is not widely held in respected foreign policy circles.

“It seems to me if you lay out our priorities in Indonesia, while reform of the Indonesian military is one important goal, the broader goal is preservation of Indonesian democracy,” said Ralph Cossa, who is president of Pacific Forum CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Sudies), in Honolulu. “If democracy actually works in Indonesia it becomes an incredibly powerful force.”

Cossa added: “If we were capable of taking a long run view, we would acknowledge that while the Indonesian military has certainly done some reprehensible things, they are also the one institution most responsible for democracy surviving thus far.”

Another experienced Indonesian hand, Edward Masters, said that he fully agrees with Cossa. “Whether we like it or not, the military will continue to play an important role in Indonesia,” says Masters, a former U.S. ambassador to Jakarta.

“This idea of boycotting somebody just because you don’t agree with them doesn’t make sense to me.”

Masters added, “I think that it is very important that we support Megawati, and also to work with the military in moving ahead with their reform program.”

If there were evidence that the Leahy amendment had inspired positive results, the senator’s case for its continuance would be stronger. Unfortunately, those in the Indonesian military who were responsible for what happened in East Timor in 1999 haven’t been brought to justice. Indonesian specialists believe that if there ever are such prosecutions, it won’t be because of the Leahy amendment.

Even civilian Indonesian officials who are working very hard at the task of making democracy take root in this fragile soil say that they are offended at the lack of respect as personified by the Leahy amendment. Indonesia needs help in solving its own problems — which it will solve on its own — they say, not hectoring from America.

Since 1999, Indonesia has moved on.

But Congress hasn’t moved on.

On Capitol Hill, the unilateralist micromanagers remain a formidable force.

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